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ENTILEMENTS: UNINTENDED PARADOXES OF
THE GENEROUS STATE
JAMES V. SCHALL, S. J.*
There will always be a wide range of difficult situations, as
well as hidden and grave needs, which the manifold provi-
dence of the State leaves untouched, and of which it can in
no way take account. Wherefore, there is always wide-
spread scope for human action by private citizens and for
Christian charity. Finally, it is evident that in stimulating
efforts relating to spiritual welfare, the work done by indi-
vidual men and by private civic groups has more value than
what is done by public authorities. - John XXIII, Mater et
Magistra1
I.
A cartoon in The New Yorker puts us in the living room of an
uppity, probably Manhattan apartment. We see a reading lamp
and, on the wall, a painting of what appears to be an odalisque.
A father in his reading glasses and comfortable turtle-neck
sweater is sitting in the sofa-chair paging through what looks like
nothing so much as The New York Times. Beside him at the chair's
right arm is his young son, about age five. The son is stationary
holding in his hand the cord of a toy fire truck that he has obvi-
ously been pulling around the room while his father was reading
the paper. The boy is now, however, standing alert, looking
wide-eyed at his parent who has momentarily turned aside to
speak to him in a most fatherly fashion, as if he were revealing
the secrets of one generation to the next. The father, with a
bemused, if not devilish, look on his face, off-handedly addresses
the astonished boy. "By the way, Sam," he tells him, "as someday
you'll be paying for my entitlements, I'd like to thank you in
advance."
This cartoon, in fact, is as good an introduction to entitle-
ments as any more scholarly one could be. We have here both
the name "entitlement" - you know it is an "in" word when it
* Professor of Government, Georgetown University.
1. JOHN XXII, MATER ET MAGISTRA para. 120 (1961) reprinted in SEVEN
GREAT ENCYCI~cALs at 244 (1963).
2. J.B. Handelsman, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 1, 1996, at 67.
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appears in a New Yorker cartoon - together with current intima-
tions about what it means. The lore about entitlements is that
the younger generations will, much to their chagrin and
expense, have to support, at rapidly increasing cost, the tremen-
dous economic burden that the aging generations are going to
cost. Notice here that we find implied nothing of the old-fash-
ioned notion that families support each other in youth and old
age via their own provisions and foresight. The son, whether he
likes it or not, will take care of the father through the interven-
tion of the all-powerful state. The son is expected, precisely, to
"pay" for his father's entitlements.
The father, be it further noticed, is not working to leave his
son an inheritance so that his son can have a better start in the
world. Nor is the father saving for his own retirement. The
father expects to be provided for by the mandatory entitlements
that his son's generation will have to work to finance. And lest
he, the father, seem ungrateful for this bounty, he is giving Sam,
his son, an advanced word of appreciation while he (the father)
is thinking of it. Sam, needless to say, stands bug-eyed before this
inexplicable information that dooms him to slave away all his life
to provide for his own and others' of his age parents. The father
is obviously pleased at this ironic turn of events as it lets him off
the hook for providing for his declining years. Probably the only
cloud on his horizon is mandatory euthanasia when the entitle-
ments' burden becomes too high for keeping dottering old men
alive.
The morning I began these considerations, to continue
these introductory remarks, I boarded the D.C. Metro Subway at
Rosslyn, in Virginia, to go to Metro Center in the District of
Columbia. I had to go there to buy four $10 senior citizen Metro
tickets, to which I am entitled, having duly proved and registered
my chronological age at a local library on Wisconsin Avenue and
R Street. The only place where I can buy these tickets, however,
is at Metro Center. If I am out of pre-purchased tickets, I cannot
use the normal fare kiosks at Metro stations for the special senior
ticket. Without my entitled, pre-purchased ticket, I have to pay
the regular steep fare. With these tickets, I cut the cost of a regu-
lar Metro fare more than half. Whether I am rich or poor does
not make any difference in acquiring these tickets. Age, not
need or merit, alone counts. Similar reductions exist for chil-
dren. To use another word, I might say that I have a "privilege,"
a private law or arrangement to cover a special case that the legis-
lator deems worthy. Presumably, the regular fares on Metro or
general taxes are levied to pay for my less expensive ticket. Just
as there is no such thing as a free lunch, so there is no such thing
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as a reduced Metro fare for which someone does not have to pay
the difference, though I grant the free enterprise possibility, to
which public entities are notoriously blind, that lower fares may
in fact induce more to use the system and thus increase revenue!
On coming back from Metro Center, moreover, I took
another line and got off at Dupont Circle, a stop that enabled me
to use a bus transfer without having to pay extra. When I walked
over to P Street, I noticed that several people were waiting for the
G-2 Bus, which, as my good luck would have it, had just pulled
up. As the first lady in line started to get on the bus, the driver
asked her to stand back. Suddenly, noise of whirring machinery
indicated that the lift for disabled passengers, installed by law in
every city bus, was in operation. When it had extended itself, a
gentleman in a wheel chair was efficiently lifted down to the side-
walk. He proceeded to wheel himself away and we all boarded
the bus after the lift had been replaced. This man was again enti-
tled to have the same ease of transportation as normal citizens,
whatever the added cost of installing the lift mechanism on every
bus might be.
These somewhat random but common incidents of humor
and every-day existence serve to call our attention to the mean-
ing and problems that occur in a political society in which enti-
tlements have come to play. an unexpectedly large role. At first
sight, entitlements appear both as rights and as gifts from a gen-
erous state honorably seeking to provide for everyone. On the
other hand, someone must pay for this generosity. What appears
to be free usually is not. And secondly, entitlements, particularly
those administered by the government, seem to undermine per-
sonal initiative and responsibility so that they become but
another example of the growth and extent of the control of mod-
em state in the lives of its citizens. Clearly, entitlements deserve
serious examination.
II.
The word "entitlement" cannot be found in Aristotle's The
Politics' or in St. Thomas' discussions of natural law, jus gentium,
or justice, though one might argue that hints of it can be found
in certain aspects of their discussions of distributive justice and
epichia or equity. It does not appear in the Ten Commandments,
in the Declaration of Independence,4 in the Constitution,5 or in
3. ARISTOTLE, PoLrrcs (Carnes Lord trans., University of Chicago Press
1984).
4. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
5. U.S. CONST.
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the first Ten Amendments.6 One searches in vain for it in the
1935 Edition of the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,7 nor is it in
the 1968 International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.8 The word
is not in the Spell-Check of Word Perfect 6.0, but it is in the
Random House College Dictionary of 1975, where "entitle" itself
means "to give a person or thing a title, right or claim to some-
thing; furnish with grounds for laying a claim." Evidently the
"title" is "given" not "due" or "earned." The verb "entitle" has
overtones of giving titles of nobility, of something to do with
honor more than justice or debt. Entitlement first appears in the
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature in 1988 with no specific jour-
nal entry, but with this interesting note, "See Economic Assist-
ance, Domestic."9 As a technical word, the term has been in the
courts since the late 1960's. Only after 1991 does it appear with
any regularity in the Periodical Indices.
Interestingly enough, what we can learn from this brief sur-
vey is that in the beginning of its recent development, "entitle-
ment," for the index classifiers at least, seemed to be understood
as a domestic variant of "foreign aid." And "aid" in any form
usually had the connotation of something temporary, something
supplied to get some project or work started, something supple-
mentary or helpful, something due to largess. The first entitle-
ment entry in the Social Science Index1 ° was in 1991, in which an
article from The Economiste' of London was listed with the instruc-
tive title, "The Entitlement Mentality," as if it were some sort of
mind-set, if not a disease. At first the word seemed to be merely a
budgetary term, a way to account for the disbursement of certain
government monies, without any implied philosophical implica-
tions about the theoretic grounds to explain why such monies
should be offered. In its usage all along, the word hovered very
closely to the word "right," itself a word of some considerable
ambiguity in modern thought and one always in need of clarifica-
tion about how it is being used.
The Latin word for "right" in pre-modern thought was jus, a
word that meant something objective, something apart from
human will, some norm of reason which the will searched out
and to which it was obligated. Jus meant what was objectively
right or due in an exchange or relationship, what one was
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I-X.
7. ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCENCEs 5 (1931).
8. INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 5 (1968).
9. Entitlement Programs (US.), 48 READER' GUIDE TO PERIODI LrrERATURE
666 (1989).
10. Entitlement Spending, 18 Soc. SCI INDEX 623 (1992).
11. The Entitlement Mentality, ECONOMIST, Sept. 28, 1991, at 26.
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obliged to whether he liked it or not. Jus called us because of
what it was, because of its rightness. After Hobbes, however, the
word "right" in most modem thought lost its objective grounding
and became, following perhaps Suarez, subjective.' 2 It began to
mean what was thought to be due to someone, what someone
else owed us. Jus had an otherness and objective emphasis;
"right" has an individualist and subjective stress. "Right" was not
correlative to anything objective. Right was what was "owed" to
us whether we did anything to deserve it or not. For Hobbes in
the state of nature we literally had a right, no restriction, to every-
thing and anything. And as the list of "rights" began to expand
to cover more and more aspects of life, modern thought began
to search for someone or something to give us our due, our
rights, when we could not simply "take them" by our own powers.
Man has a natural "right" to everything, to repeat the view of
Hobbes and his modem followers. 3 Eventually this "right" came
to be guaranteed by the all-powerful state that took over, by an
incontrovertible logic, the dire consequences of everyone having
a right to everything - the war of all against all. From its sub-
sumption of all rights into itself, the state took on the the duties
of assigning rights according to its own purposes. Rights became
what the state enforced with effective penalties. Hobbes was sub-
sequently considered one of the main founders of modern liber-
alism because his all-powerful state took away all reasons for
theological and philosophical controversy or warfare.' 4 As a
result of its imposed peace, the state became richer and richer.
There was more and more to distribute. The state's contract with
its citizens decided their rights, apart from which, having aban-
doned the state of nature, no rights in effect existed. The last
vestiges of the classic natural rights which limited the state were
almost totally subsumed into the unlimited state as itself a rights
defining and dispensing institution. The negative state that pre-
vented strife and war and guaranteed justice became the welfare
state, or what I will call "the Generous State," the one that distrib-
uted benefits according to its own perception of what citizens
want and need.
Legally, rights were often originally "liberties", a stated free-
dom from certain laws and customs, a limitation on govern-
12. SeeJoHN FiNNis, NATURAL LAw AND NATuRAL RIGHT 198-230 (1980).
13. See E.B.F. MIDGLEY, HOBBES: LEVIATHAN (Editorial Magisterio Espafiol,
1987).
14. See LEo STRAusS, THE PoLrrcAL PHmosopI4Y OF HOBBES: ITS BASIS AND
ITS GENESIS (1952). See THoMAS HOBBES, On the Rights of Sovereignes by Institution,
THE LEvIATHAN 288-39 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin, 1972) (1651).
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ment.15  Government was seen initially as an institution
preventing individual liberties from coming forth. But it soon
came to mean the institution that "guaranteed" and fostered
rights and liberties and eventually the institution that defined
and made rights possible. Rights were also originally considered
to be consequent on duties. Rights look at what is due to an
individual or what someone cannot be prevented from doing or
having. Duties, on the other hand, refer to what someone ought
to do. If we only had rights but no one had duties to us, we
would profit nothing from them. For example, if I have a "right
to life" but no one has a moral or legal "duty" not to kill me, the
"right" really profits me little. Governments existed to enforce
the rights that free will and voluntary negotiation could not
effect.
Classic "bills of rights" from the English, French, and Ameri-
can Revolutions did not talk of entitlements, but the lists of
"rights" that came into fashion with international organizations
after World War II did have "economic and social" rights, notions
that come pretty close to what we mean by entitlements.1 6 Eco-
nomic and social rights were much more ambiguous than classi-
cal natural rights, themselves also denied any ontological status
in modern philosophy. 7 With economic and social rights, it is
much more difficult to identify just who owes what to those said
to be entitled. 8 Obviously, a poor society cannot entitle its citi-
zens to benefits it cannot produce. Economic or social rights or
entitlements had something vague about them, something whose
existence depended on something else, the existence of which it
did not profoundly concern itself. This something that provided
a rational and definition of rights due was more and more the
all-powerful state. Human flourishing and well-being were not so
much the responsibility of the individuals but of the state. Para-
doxically, claims against the state were made in the name of defi-
nitions about individual welfare formulated by the state itself.
15. See Heinrich A. Rommen, The Genealogy of Natural Rights, 29 THOUGHT
403 (1954).
16. See JACQUES MARiTA1N, THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND THE NATURAL LAw
152-89 (1986).
17. See Raymond Dennehy, The Ontological Basis of Human Rights, 42
THOMIST 434 (1978); James V. Schall, Human Rights as an Ideological Project, 42
AM. J. JURISPRUDENCE 47 (1987).
18. See MAURICE CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? (1973); HENRY
VEATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS: FACT OR FANcY? (1985); LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL
RIGHTS AND HISTORY (1953).
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III.
"What are entitlements?" Peter Peterson and Neil Howe ask
in their 1988 study On Borrowed Time.
The term entitlement usually refers to those benefits -
whether in cash or in kind - that the federal government
automatically pays to qualified individuals. As a rule, enti-
dement programs ostensibly contain some strong social
welfare dimension, though in the case of Social Security
and Medicare, this is obscured by the insurance metaphors
commonly used to describe payroll taxes and benefits. As
defined by the House and Senate Budget Committees,
entitlements consist of any federal outlay that either
requires no annual appropriation by Congress or must be
appropriated by Congress according to the terms of some
underlying statute or program legislation. Thus, as long as
a given law remains in force, an "entitled" beneficiary can
sue the government for failure to pay benefits. If the
underlying statute were to be amended or abolished, how-
ever, program participants . .. . would have no legally
enforceable right to receive their payments."l
Similar provisions are found in most modern states and in most
state governments in the United States.
Certain benefits thus are due to certain defined classes or
types of citizens or oftentimes to all citizens. The origin of these
benefits is founded in legally enacted public purpose, one that
the courts have generally expanded in liberal fashion. It is
assumed that these benefits help and do not hinder the recipi-
ents or the polity that distributes them. Very often it takes some
time to evaluate the effects of such entitlements. Aid to depen-
dent children, clearly well-intentioned, may, in fact, end up
undermining the integrity and existence of a two-parent family
and the well-being of children themselves. Good intentions
alone do not always or even usually make good laws. No doubt
the least studied aspect of the modern state system is the analysis
of the dire effects of legislative and judicial good intentions.
Once one falls under the defined categories, in any case, he can
expect his benefit and can sue the state if it or some other entity
under its jurisdiction fails to provide for what it has promised. If
rights, privileges, and liberties were originally conceived to be
limits to or exemptions from state jurisdiction, entitlements seem
to emphasize rather what the state "owes" to its citizens, wherein
19. PETER G. PETERSON AND NElL HowE, ON BORROWED TIME: How THE
GROWTH IN ENTrLEMENT SPENDING THREATENS AMERICA'S FUTURE 77-78 (1988).
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the state keeps the power both to define what the citizen is, no
matter what his existential status as a human being from nature,
and what benefiting him means. Rights and entitlements do not
come from outside of but from within the state.
Politically, most states have found that they cannot easily
restrict entitlements once their citizens have come to "expect"
them from their government. Entitlements come close to defin-
ing and spelling out what states "owe" to their citizens. The pur-
pose of entitlements often is to bring everyone up to a certain
minimum judged to be necessary for human well-being. All the
resources of the state are commanded to meet this need to which
someone is entitled. Conceived in this fashion, the state claims a
moral purpose, a compassionate or paternal purpose. The state
assumes into itself more and more the private aid-giving institu-
tions when their moral or religious impetus or inspiration flags
or fails. Behind this notion of entitlement we must at least ask
about where this principle that the state "owes" anything to its
citizens comes from? What might entitlements imply about
human nature and the state? Is the state the only or major
source for confronting the needs that entitlements are designed
to meet?
The discourse of entitlements is almost always lofty and
noble in intention. The results of their enactment into law, how-
ever, frequently seem less exalted, often appearing to foster lazi-
ness, dependence, and state control of all phases of human life.
On the obvious assumption that whatever the state distributes
must come from someplace other than itself, from what citizens
produce or earn, entitlements, unlike say the original Home-
stead Act of the last century, emphasize not the producing aspect
of public life or the principles and attitudes that are required for
it but the distribution aspect. It takes no great subtlety to see
how such differing mentalities that emphasize distribution or
production can come into conflict in practice.
Aristotle's famous virtue of munificence, Nicomachean Eth-
ics," saw great virtue in allowing the very rich to distribute their
wealth privately in the form of things that foster the good, the
true, the beautiful, or help for the needy. This Aristotelian virtue
recognized that wealth, legitimately acquired, could be used for
good or evil purposes. The virtue sought to orient the soul to
those things that were noble and worthy, that provided for a level
of living and worth attained only by those who understood the
value and purpose of higher things in the community. While this
20. AIsToTLE, NicoMAcnEAN ETmIcs Book IV (Terence Irwin trans.,
Hackett Publishing Company 1985).
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virtue still exists in free societies, the fact is that high taxing poli-
cies, often caused by needs to pay for entitlements, minimize this
capacity and resource of munificence in the population. More-
over, with increasing control of the definitions of good, beauti-
ful, true, and what is needed, the state gains more and more
control of the culture. It, is no accident that higher education,
humanities and arts policies, and shows in museums reflect this
concentration of distribution capacities in the hands of the state.
Obviously, the term "entitlement" has been fashioned to
cover a phenomenon of the modem state, one almost has to say,
of the "welfare state." The dictionary definition of the welfare
state is, interestingly, "a state in which the welfare of the people
in such matters as social security, health, education, housing, and
the working conditions is the responsibility of the govern-
ment."21 Presumably, a non-welfare state would be one in which
the "social security, health, education, housing, and working con-
ditions of the citizens were not the responsibility of the govern-
ment" but of the citizens themselves or of some other social
body. At least some people in modern political thought have
seen such a welfare state as a "servile" state, a state in which well-
being is exchanged for government control, even if the govern-
ment be democratic and supposedly benign in form. The
essence of the "servile" state is one wherein the citizens must
work for those who do not work productively, be they capitalists
or bureaucrats. 22 Dependency on entitlements can be looked on
from this angle as a means to make the vast majority of citizens
incapable of any free movement because it would jeopardize
their welfare. Their entitlements, in other words, far from free-
ing them, have tamed them; they have no independent liberty,
such as property was originally designed to give them, from the
taxing or coercive power of the state.
IV.
Entitlements refer to the distribution of society's benefits,
usually financial but also benefits in kind, like Food Stamps, to
those who fall into this or that legislatively defined category.
Entitlements seem to be products of what I am calling here not
the welfare state but "the Generous State," for they do not merely
address dire, temporary conditions but long-range ones that
need not always exist but which are nice or helpful when they do
exist. The citizens of the Generous State are often well-off, pre-
21. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2157 (2d
ed. unabridged 1987).
22. See HaAIRE BELLoc, THE SERVILE STATE (1946).
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sumably because of the benefits they receive. That is, in terms of
average income, compared to other societies, those on entitle-
ment income seem rich in terms of goods and services. Generous
states in the modern era, however, are running into increasing
public debts and concerns about bankruptcy because, following a
principle already found in Plato, desires for benefits, once set in
motion, seem unlimited. Since the state itself produces nothing,
its so-called "generosity," a name properly used of individuals in
their personal relations to others, comes from others, from mon-
ies garnered through the taxing process. The irony of being
"generous" with someone else's money does not lessen when the
state itself is said to be generous.
Some entitlements are for everyone; some for this or that
group within society, often initially perceived to be given on a
"need" basis. It is clear that organized and active societies can
and do produce enormous wealth precisely because they are so
organized with an enterprising population. The principle of spe-
cialization is also a principle for societal wealth production. The
world is not really a zero-sum game, wherein everyone has to pro-
duce everything or wherein there is a fixed amount to be distrib-
uted such that if we give to some, we must take from others.
Belief in such a position, such as we often find in modern ecolo-
gists or environmentalists, is one of the major causes for the
increased power of the state in recent times.
The ultimate source of wealth, however, is not material
goods or things in the ground but the human brain, intelligence,
which to all practical purposes is unlimited. If we add the human
brain and its innovative capacities to the gifts of the earth, unex-
pected, enormous riches result. Entitlements are based on the
share of this wealth that is commandeered and distributed by the
state on some public basis defined in its law. Entitlements can
thus be conceived as incentives, rewards, compensations, and
free givings, but their cost can also be burdensome and counter-
productive so that they actually are a drag on society, especially
when they are looked upon independently from the problems
and conditions of production and the nature of human
intelligence.
In their present form, entitlements could not exist, however,
if the state did not exist and did not command some portion of
what is produced by citizens to be distributed on its (the state's)
and not the citizen's own criterion. The state as such is rarely, if
ever, a producer of wealth. This is, among other things, the les-
son of modern socialism and communism. Payments to a state's
own bureaucrats and administrators, moreover, can turn out to
be a huge cost, especially in states wherein the well-being provi-
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sions themselves require a large voting bureaucracy to distribute
the entitlements. Indeed, the entitlements of state employees in
terms of vacations, retirement benefits, health care, and other
privileges often are far in excess of those available to non-state
employed citizens. The employees of the state become major
political actors seeking to protect or extend their benefits and
their own entitlements.
What the state has to distribute, however, must be taken
from what is produced by someone other than its own employ-
ees. The experience of modern states is that, however necessary
a stable public order may be, these states are themselves notori-
ously poor producers of wealth and often fail to understand how
wealth is produced at all. Poverty in the modern world is often
caused, not by lack of resources, but by the state's selecting the
wrong intelligence about wealth and the conditions of its
increase. The ability of a state to offer entitlements is always
jeopardized by its taking, usually through taxes, of much too
high a percentage of the wealth of its people. This is why the
best entitlements policy must always be that which leaves as much
as possible with those who produced the wealth in the first place
for their own provisioning of their needs. It is notjust a question
of the volume of money collected from the productive citizens
but of resultant lowering or destruction of incentives. In this
sense, the claim to entitlements brings us straight to profound
questions in economics and political philosophy.
V.
Perhaps the oldest efforts to distribute benefits came from
the wars, from pensions and allotments of land or money, later to
G.I. Bills and guaranteed benefits on retirement, payments, PX
privileges, Veterans' Hospitals and Homes. Here, in the case of
the military in all societies, there was the relation between mili-
tary compensations to distributive justice and to the unequal
bearing of others' burdens in war and defense. Soldiers in the
Roman legions looked for grants of land on being mustered out
of service. Those who fought in battles or served in armies were
considered to be entitled to special rewards or benefits, in many
cases to lifetime care, from a grateful citizenry whose freedom
the armies had defended or preserved. Failure to carry through
promised recompense was in many societies a course of civil dis-
turbance if not governmental overthrow.
On retirement from the military, which happened by com-
parative standards at quite an early age in recent times, the vet-
eran could go to work and make whatever sort of income he
1997]
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could garner. Aside from income tax totals, his military income
was simply a regularly received payment or allotment. The vet-
eran considered that he was entitled to it, even that he earned it.
If he did not want to do another thing the rest of his life, that was
fine too. This distribution of benefits was looked upon as a mat-
ter ofjustice. And that word justice brings us back to the classical
discussions of general and special justice, of commutative and
distributive justice, of equity and fairness. Entitlements did not
seem to have quite the aura of justice or right connected to
them.
All forms of justice had the connotation of "rendering what
was due." Justice relationships needed to be defined in terms as
clear as possible to be understood, preferably in mathematical or
proportional terms. It needed to be evident that someone was
not getting something for nothing, but for a title, a reason. Get-
ting something for nothing was indeed a very high form of
exchange, perhaps the highest, something we call gift or bene-
fice, but it was not justice and did not fall under the aura of the
state. A world of only justice was a terrible world since it only
looked to exchanges, to abstract relationships, not to the persons
who did the exchanging in their particularity. But still justice was
a reality and could not be overlooked except, again, voluntarily
or freely. Notions of forgiveness and repentance were designed
to mitigate the rigidities ofjustice. There was something particu-
larly noble about not demanding justice. One could accept
another's burden or give of what was justly his without demand-
ing anything in return. Justice indeed seemed to exist for some-
thing beyond itself; it seemed limited.
Entitlements somehow appeared to recognize that this
something beyond justice can be articulated even by the state,
though one might still argue whether what is being gotten at by
entitlements is the best way for a society to meet its problems,
even its peripheral problems. "Rights talk," as Mary Ann Glen-
don called it, or "entitlements talk," as I will call it here, seems to
bear the connotation of a demand that something be given
freely, an obvious contradiction.2" If something is given freely,
and that is our perfection in a way, it is not by way of right, which
has the implication of something due, that is, something not
given freely but given because something objective obliges.
Commutative or rectificatory (making right) justice was that
exchange that took place either because of damage done by acci-
dent or deliberation, such as skidding into another car because
23. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALIx THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF PUBLIC
DISCOURSE (1991).
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of a flat or because of stealing, or because of advantages gained
by voluntary agreement. What is characteristic of all forms ofjus-
tice is the mutual and equitable exchange. What is owed is what
is to be returned. Justice enabled damage to be repaired or it
enabled something new to enter the world through entrepre-
neurship. Careful accounting of who did what, of who was
responsible for what, was in effect in commutative justice. On
this basis of surety, one could go ahead and plan rationally and
expect results of one's foresight and work to be apportioned out
fairly. Justice wants rewards to be assigned exactly and with rea-
son, with title.
Insofar as the state entered into these agreements or
exchanges, it was primarily to hold the contractors to their
pledged word. Without the assumption of justice, very little
would be undertaken. In the case of distributive justice in which
the common goods or burdens of society were assessed and
meted out, however, the principle of exchange was after the
manner of proportionate contribution or proportionate burden.
Civil disturbances or unrest, Aristotle had told us in the Fifth
Book of The Politics, 4 occurred when those who contributed
more felt they were rewarded less or when those who had no
distinction thought that everyone ought to be treated absolutely
equally, no matter what more they did. The polity, in any case,
was recognized as an arena in which there was a common good,
that is, where many different private and individual goals and
institutions could flourish because there was a settled order so
that everyone did not have to do everything. The state did not
"do" everything but provided the settled order in which myriads
of individuals and their organizations could operate to do what
they saw fit. If the state tried itself do everything, it would violate
its own common good. The Platonic undercurrent to this princi-
ple simply meant that spiritual and material riches of the whole
required that many different talents be allowed to flourish. Not
everyone could or had the time to do everything.
VI.
In his book, Thoughts on Machiavelli, Leo Strauss remarked
that one of the causes of disorder in the modern state was precip-
itated by Christianity in a rather paradoxical fashion.25 Strauss'
point is a subtle one. He argued that revelation had caused an
elevated expectation about what human nature by itself could
and would be able to accomplish. That is, ideas of charity,
24. ARISTOTLE, supra note 3.
25. LEO STRAuss, THOUGHTS ON MAcmAvELUt 86, 174 (1958).
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mercy, forgiveness, and sacrifice, which came into existence by
virtue of doctrines and inspirations resulting from grace, from
revelation, began to evaporate in modernity. What did not
change so much, however, were the ideals or goals that these
teachings put into existence. That is, the elevated expectations
were still in the souls of the populace so that, even with the
decline of belief and moral virtue, the accomplishment of these
ideals became the duties not of charity or church but of the mod-
ern state, whose instruments of action did not include mercy. At
the foundations of the modern state is a sense of compassion
divorced from grace. Compassion apart from grace in practice is
pride, the claim that what is not within our powers is capable of
being accomplished by us by non-revelational means, by our own
capacities, in other words. For our purposes here, this means
that the state has come to be responsible for goals that were not
conceived possible by normal political or economic institutions,
but which were anticipated by grace. In a sense, the Kingdom of
God came to mean something happening primarily in this world
through political means.
A further element in this consideration has to do with the
modern idea of rights. The modern idea of rights has its origins
in Hobbes and his state of nature.26 Rights, contrary to the older
natural law thinking, were presupposed to nothing. Man had a
natural right to everything, a right that required no natural or
divine law. Rights came to mean, as we have indicated, what the
government, the Leviathan, granted to us. The modern notion
of rights had connected with it a kind of arbitrariness. Rights
were not "natural" but "civil." The state was designed to define
and protect rights, but rights in the first place were what the state
granted. Rights were created by legislation. We knew what was a
law because we could see what the state enforced. Once we gave
up our natural right to everything by entering the state, we did
not have a right to anything but what the state enforced or
defined. No one had to bother about some sort of "higher law."
If we put these several ideas together, we can begin to
understand what is behind the question of entitlements.
"[R] ights ... are demands for government goods and services,"
R. Shep Melnick has written, "rather than for demands for pro-
tection against government intrusion - entitlements, rather
than liberties.... [T] he traditional American emphasis on indi-
vidual rights has melded with the modern welfare state. If the
older view of rights as individual liberty delayed and stunted the
26. THoMAs HOBBES, On Rights of Sovereignes by Institution, in THE
LEVILATA, supra note 14, at 228-39.
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growth of the welfare state, then the newer view of rights as enti-
tlements has helped it to flourish.", 7 We have here stated in
clear terms the problem that entitlements present. The earlier
view of rights was a means to restrict the state. This was Locke's
idea that that government governs best that governs least. The
government was conceived to be primarily an impediment to
individual liberty. The government was designed to protect this
individual liberty. It is with Rousseau and Mill that individual
liberty becomes social liberty, that what we want is what the state
wants for us.
2 8
Why have entitlements enabled the government to flourish?
One aspect of this question would be that the size of government
increased to administer the entitlements themselves designed to
provide for the people. Government itself became a major cost.
Those who worked for the government, in terms of vacations,
health insurance, retirement, conditions of labor, turned out to
be the most protected group in society. Entitlement programs
also became the vested interest of those who administered the
program. Government workers did not work for good will or
charity. The service structure to administer politicized compas-
sion was itself a great independent cost. A certain significant per-
centage of every sum spent on compassion and entitlement went
to those who administered the program. Thomas Sowell has
pointed out that in terms of foreign aid, the amount of money
returned to the Third World from families of immigrants or
guest workers exceeded all the public foreign aid of all the
nations. We can wonder whether some analogous system not on
the state level might not be a better one to achieve the purposes
that entitlements were designed to accomplish.
VII.
From the viewpoint of political philosophy, in conclusion,
how does one take the measure of entitlements? There is an
ancient argument about the state and its justification. The first
argument stems from Aristotle and Aquinas, both of whom
understood the darker side of human nature, especially the
tyrannical tendencies that are often found in human experience.
Their positive argument maintains that, in spite of the admitted
27. R St-op MEuL.mc, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS
274 (1994).
28. SeeJEAN-JAcQUES RoussEAu, ON THE SocIAL CoNTRAcr (Donald Cress
trans., Hackett Publishing Company 1983); Henry M. Magid, John Stuart Mill, in
HIsTORY OF POLMrICAL PHLosopHY 784, 796-800 (Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey
eds., 3d ed. 1987).
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defects of actual human nature, the state is a natural institution.
Man is by nature a political animal, but not only a political
animal. Or better, it can be argued that in being a political
animal, man is still a being whose end and purposes transcend
anything limited to the state's purposes itself. This means that by
the very fact of his following his given nature, man should set up
a civil polity to enable him to do many things that could not be
done or done as well outside of this formal organization. But it
also means that even with the state institutions in effect, these
civil institutions do not exhaust or define man's highest
purposes.
This state could be organized according to various ends, not
all of which were noble. The question of the best regime and its
location was a crucial one, even though the best regime that
could be expected in politics in this world existed only rarely. All
actual regimes were in practice less than the best. Man's disor-
dered soul could reflect itself, as Plato knew, in his political
organization The Republic, Books VIII-IX.29 But implicitly, the
state existed that the myriad forms of good that man could cause
and ought to cause could come to pass. The state existed, in
other words, that the highest things might exist, things that were
mostly beyond the state. Human actions, however, were legiti-
mate and their expressions in terms of habits and laws were the
proper, if limited, arena of the state.
The second view of the state, one associated with Augustine,
held that the state was primarily a remedial institution; it only
existed because of sin or the Fall, which itself ought not to have
existed. Man is not by nature a political animal in this view.5 °
The fact is, as any minimally observant person knows, that there
is a wide scope for evil and greed in the world that constantly
manifests itself, even in terms of law and political institutions.
This situation was discussed in the classic authors in terms of
decline of regimes or disordered regimes. The kings and
princes, senators and rulers, that organize and rule the state are
themselves subjected to the consequences of the Fall.
That is, the state can be the most dangerous of human insti-
tutions, multiplying evil as well as good. Not infrequently in his-
tory the state has been the most dangerous enemy of human
dignity. The best the state can do is to keep disorder at a mini-
mum without ever promising anything approaching perfection.
29. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC Books VIII-IX (Richard W. Sterling & William
C. Scott trans., Norton 1985).
30. See HERBERT DEANE, THE POLrCAL AND SOCIAL IDEAS Or ST.
AUGUSTINE 116-53 (1963).
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This is the sort of realism that greets us with any historical knowl-
edge of human existence. And in terms of the topic of these
reflections, of entitlements designed to benefit citizens and the
operations of the Generous State, we can expect that such
arrangements will be subject to abuse and in fact may serve to
corrupt, in some unexpected but easily identifiable fashion, a
whole society in the name of something that seemed like a wor-
thy enterprise.
In examining the mechanisms of entitlement legislation
over the years, it is not difficult to see the Augustinian side of
what seemed to be a worthy proposal working itself out. In civil
life as in personal life, it remains true-that we judge legislation by
what we intend it to do, but we must be honest enough to see
that we must also examine it in the context of what it does do.
Entitlement proposals seem to be a product of efforts to guaran-
tee a stable and prosperous life for the citizens of modem states.
The state sees itself as dispensing good things to its citizens, as
fulfilling its obligations to them in terms of distributive justice.
The question remains, however, whether the state should be
the institution that is primarily responsible for this otherwise
laudable purpose. Certain minimal things must be granted to
the state both as a directing and as a remedial institution. On
the other hand, the state is one institution among others. It is, if
we can put it this way, that institution that makes it possible for
other institutions to exist and flourish. Likewise, it is, because of
its coercive monopoly, that institution that can prevent their
developing. The most important things are not found in the
state. The temptation of all modem states is to deny this proposi-
tion, to assume into themselves those elevated expectations that
were implanted into the soul of man by revelation but to assume
that these expectations could be provided by means other than
those indicated in that same revelation.
Once man is no longer seen as someone whose ultimate pur-
pose and destiny transcends the state, his sights are lowered to
this life. When this lowering takes place in the minds of individu-
als, then the relative rank of the state is elevated to that of the
most important institution available to man. It has subsumed
into itself those things formerly held to belong to something
higher than the state. Aristotle had said that politics is the high-
est practical science, not the highest science as such. One could
argue, as I do argue, that the modem discourse of rights and
entitlements is the result of this subtle displacement of the posi-
tion of the state from that of a natural institution subject to the
nature and ends of man to that of the highest institution itself.
The function of the state comes to be the defining and providing
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function for all that is needed for human life, a provision that
conceives its task in primarily this-worldly terms. The state
expresses itself in terms of laws, rights, entitlements, and bene-
fits. The growth of entitlements, of the state's increasing control
of human well-being in all its phases, including primarily its very
definition, is the case of a well-intentioned proposal going wrong
because its authors' understanding of what it was about is moti-
vated by ideas and provisions that work against human nature
and destiny as that is understood in its fullness.
The redress of this growing control of the state through its
benefit giving, generously motivated activities, it would seem,
lies, at the institutional level, with a re-emphasis on the produc-
tion side of human well-being, on what produces wealth and the
virtues and essentially private but still social institutions that
result when people are given the freedom and duty to provide
for themselves."1 Movements such as home schooling, removing
education from state bureaucracies, innovative business gener-
ated through small capital beginnings reflect the vitality of a free
and responsible people allowed to provide for themselves. Again
here we need to be reminded that there is no substitute for accu-
rate understanding of human purpose and human vice, of what
resources are available to us in both traditions of virtue and in
traditions of revelation. What has caused the modem state the
freedom to incorporate into itself ideas and institutions that have
worked against human worth has not originally been the state
itself. The first disorders of a society always originate in the
minds and hearts of the dons, academic and clerical. It is true
that we can suggest, as I have done here, the consequences of
these disorders in political terms. The fact remains, following a
suggestion of Edmund Burke, that a virtuous people can make
even bad institutions plausibly work for worthy projects and an
unvirtuous people can ruin even the best of political or eco-
32nomic arrangements.
Entitlements are in fact political and economic realities that
most often were proposed and enacted with the best of inten-
tions. As their purposes worked themselves out, however, it
became clear that they had the effect of transferring much
wealth and independence of the citizen over to the state. Theo-
retically, the state assumed the responsibility not only of well-
being but of defining well-being. The Generous State treated its
citizens and especially those who directly worked for it exceed-
31. SeeJAMES V. SCHALL, RELIGION, WEALTH, AND POVERTY (1990).
32. See EDMUND BURKE, REFLEcTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE
(J.G.A. Pocock ed., Hackett Publishing Company 1987).
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ingly well. Somehow, it also corrupted the whole social order
because it did not attend to the productive or innovative side of
human reality and the vast reaches of intelligence and organiza-
tion that were located there. This is why the remarks from John
XXIII cited at the beginning of these reflections remain so perti-
nent. The secret sources of grace and human energy need to be
allowed to work, need to be fostered through the principle of
leaving things at the lowest level as possible, through not wanting
the state to provide for all ills and the righting of all wrongs.
The state as the primary substitute for divine providence and
bounty is a dangerous entity precisely because it has lost contact
with the true destiny and nature of man as he exists in this world.
We have, so to speak, been blessed with an "entitlement" that
always limits the state and elevates us to a higher level than the
state can provide for us. When this higher level is restricted,
unrecognized, not allowed to grow, the state will see human life
as a failure on its own terms. It will come to see its own task as
that of replacing those energies and forces that are no longer
encouraged or allowed to exist in human society.
The generous state easily becomes the all-caring and all-pow-
erful state, seeing itself as acting in the highest and most noble
motives. Entitlements that reduce us to wards or subjects of state
largess as the proper and only ambiance for our actions and
security are not neutral either in theory or in practice. Reflec-
tions on entitlements, like all questions of politics and econom-
ics, can and should bring us to confront the conditions and
nature of the highest things. When we do not have these latter
considerations in proper order, we will in all likelihood end up
corrupting even those institutions, such as entitlements, that we
proposed and put into effect with the most noble of intentions.
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